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THE ROLE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS IN WATER SUPPLYlJPLANNING:
AVOIDING THE FALLACY OF COMPOSITION
by Jay C. Andersen ~I
Things are not always as they seem. Presented here are a fe\'J
examples of first impressions and possible errors in thought patterns.
As an example, by some means the size of the earth is to be increased by
one foot in diameter. Transcontinental Airlines and others are concerned
with how much further it will be around the circumference of the earth.
What is your answer? Quick! What's your answer?
You probably over-estimated.

Turn to an analytical system.

C = 1T 0
where C = circumference
o = diameter
with
change in D (60) , we can calculate
Then,
6C = 1T6D
6C = 3.1416 X 1
or,
= 3.1416 feet
Fortunately, a system can lead us to a correct determinatio n.
and first impressions often fail.

Inspection

How do we interpret trends? We may observe the stability in growth
in certain variables and project as Mark Twain did:1I
In the space of one hundred and seventy-six year, the
Lower Mississippi has shortened itself two hundred and
forty-two miles. That is an average of a trifle over one
mile and a third per year. Therefore, any calm person,
who is not blind or idiotic, can see that in the Old
Oolitic Silurian Period, just a million years ago next
November, the Lower Mississippi River was upward of one
million three hundred thousand miles long, and stuck
out over the Gulf of Mexico like a fishing-rod. And by
the same token, any person can see that seven hundred and
forty-two years from now, the Lower Mississippi will be
l/Paper presented at U. S. Army Corps of Engineers Conference on
Water Supply Planning, Albuquerque, New Mexico, March 20-23, 1978 .
.£/professor and Head, Department of Economics, Utah State University,
Logan, Utah, 84321.

lI Mark Twain, "Life on the Mississippi ," THE FAr~ILY MARK TWAIN,
Harper & Brothers, New York, p. 86.
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only a mile and three-quarters long, and Cairo and New
Orleans will have joined their streets together, and be
plodding comfortably along under a single mayor and a
mutual board of aldermen. There is something fascinating
about science. One gets such wholesale returns of conjecture out of such a trifling investment of fact.
In economics we often refer to the fallacy of composition. What
is the "fallacy of composition"? The fallacy is, "What is true for the
individual or part is necessarily also true for the group or whole."
Let's turn to some examples that are more directly involved with
water resources than Mark Twain's example.
Example: Increased water supply to a farmer increases production so that
he realizes a bumper crop. The farmer's income is larger than formerly.
Therefore, if water supply is increased to all fanners, they will be
better off. This applies to farmers as a group.
Wrong. Because price declines as total output goes up, and as
all farmers realize bumper crops, price is depressed. If price declines
overbalance the large output, farm incomes fall. Whether total income
rises or falls depends oupon the price elasticity of demand for the products;
that is, the coefficient of change in relative quanitity as compared to the
relative change in price. For most agricultural products, the demand is
inelastic so that price varies relatively more than quantity. Thus, as
quantity is increased, price is forced down relatively more so that total
income to farmers falls.
That's an easy example. It's plain to see the fallacy of extending
the finding beyond its logical limits. In economics the difference between
the individual and the aggregate is distinguished as micro-economics and
macro-economics. Let's turn to some examples that are less obvious. In
water supply analysis, a systems approach provides the macro view that
avoids the fallacy of composition.
Example:

Improvements in irrigation efficiency lead to increases in welfare.

Not necessarily. Begin with the concept of irrigation efficiency.
It's definition is the ratio of the amount of water consumptively used in
evapotranspiration of plants to the amount of water diverted. Thus, the
higher the proportion of the diversion actually used up, the more efficient
the system. The problem arises in the distinction of the incentive system
at the micro (farm) level and the results in a basin-wide context. Individual
proprietors seek to increase their efficiency because their water right is
often defined in terms of the amount that they are authorized to divert
from the canal or stream. They see the opportunity to (1) distribute water
more evenly and increase yields, and (2) irrigate more acres with a better
water supply because of careful husbandry. They may do this by spr"inkling,
improving canals and ditches, leveling the land, or simply applying more
intensive labor and management to the irrigation process.
As might be
expected, a smaller proportion of water diverted from streams and canals
returns to the downstream water flow.
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In the Sevier River Basin in Utah, which is a closed basin, many
have said that the flow of the river is entirely diverted seven times.
The accuracy of this statement cannot be attested, but it seems to be
approximately true. In the Sevier Basin when upstream users adopt improved
irrigation practices and irrigate more acres with a full-season supply, the
water supply to the lower basin becomes lessened. This happens despite a
court decree that allocates portions of the flow to upper and lower
basin users. Whether overall welfare is increased or decreased depends on
the relative values of the upstream and downstream uses and the cost of
the improvemnts. As a certainty there arises an equity problem. Legal
actions have become commonplace in the Sevier Basin.
It is a problem. Farmers who want to improve irrigation say that
irrigation water rights are property rights. They claim they can do as
they please with these rights. They stress that not being able to expand
acreage reduces incentive to conserve water and become efficient.
But, what of the downstream user who also has a patented water
right and a long-standing use of water coming from the upstream return flows?
Is the water right less valid? Only the courts can decide this equity issue.
It is clear that any analysis of this water supply bearing on the economic
efficiency and equity of the situation must depend on an overall system
evaluation.
Example: Each of a group of farmers sell one-fourth of their direct flow
water rights for use in an energy development so that we expect a decline
in agricultural production.
Not necessarily. In one case where this has happened, the power
company paid farmers perhaps 10 times the agricultural value for a portion
of the water right sold and has built a dam to store and regulate the flow
of the river. This has provided for a season-long availability of water.
Lined canals and other conveyances have been built to improve the conveyance
efficiency of the delivery system so that a greater proportion of the
vlater is actua-Ily delivered. In summary, the water supply the farmers have
is more secure and in greater quantity, especially in the late part of the
year, than was formerly the case. A cursory pre-evaluation could have led
to erroneous conclusions.
Example: For energy projects it is proposed to adopt a "tota '1 containment"
policy for water diverted to prevent the salty water from returning to the
river in order to insure a higher guality water in the lower reaches of the
river.
It may not work: There are two parts to the quality problem. The
measurement may be salt load, which is the total quantity of salt flowing
down the river in a dissolved state. Or, the measurement may be concentration, which indicates the proportion of salt to a given amount of water.
Each of these may be important depending on the particular concern in the
downstream area.
In a river modeling study of the Colorado River, the results suggest
that as energy development with total containment proceeds through time,
the total tons of salt load would decrease relative to the base situation.
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Compare lines 1 and 3 in Table 1. As can be seen in Table 1, the salt
load would be decidedly higher with medium rather than the high energy
utilization level which would l~ad to greater flows. The salt load
would be small under high utilization and the consequent 10~1 flow.
At the same time, salt concentration in the river would rise
with accelerated energy development. The conclusion is that an increased
rate of energy development would result i n an increase in concentration
at Imperial Dam. This effect is due to the reduced flows of water for
dilution particularly due to the anticipated total containment technology.
A situation which seems to escape some concerned parties is that water
returned from once-through cooling in the upper basin is likely of better
quality than the quality of water flowing in the lower basi n.
Table 1.

Predicted Salinity Effects at Imperial Dam of Al ternative Future
Uses in the Colorado River Basin

Assumed Flow
~1 i 11 ion Ac re
Feet/Year

Utilization Level
Agric. Energy Export

Sal t Load
(Million
ton/year)
1977 1983 19902000

Sa 1t :'.
Concentration
(mg/l)
1977 1983 19902000

14

Medium Medium Medium

916

912

784

828

922

1090

14

High

Medium Medium

927

920

790

844

956

1162

14

Medium

High

916

905

755

828

928

1142

14

Medium Medium High

872

875

780

839

937

1097

Source:

Medium

Bishop, A. B., J. C. Andersen, et. ale IIColorado River Regional
Assessment Study,1I Prepared for National Commission on Water
Quality, Utah Water Research Laboratory, Utah State University
Logan, Utah. Part 1, pp. 156-158.

It appears that energy may have significant impacts on local and
regional water allocations and quality. Upon whom the impacts fall will
depend to a great extent on institutional and economic constraints and incentives which are imposed, either as a result of historical development or
future policy directions. It is not so clear that energy development will be
a detriment to either upstream or downstream users of the Colorado River.
Investigations of the problem have lacked depth and a broad systems
perspective in many cases. The case of the total conta i nment technology
being represented to solve salinity problems is an example. If only one
side (in this case the salt load) is considered, the answer to the problem
may be different than if other factors are brought to bear, ~;uch as having
water for dilution and the extra costs incurred. A strong objective look
at the social, economic, and physical problems is suggested.
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Example : Use of recreation facili.ties adjacent to a reservoir tends to be
self-limiting because of aversion to congestion so that a socially optimal
rate of use is achieved.
Not with free access. 11 Social or economic welfare is generated
by the use or exp 1oi ta ti on of a free but fi xed faci 1i ty. The di vergence
between marginal social and private costs leads to resource misallocation.
The services of the common facility directly enters the utility functions
of consumers. Crowding is perceived by users as a deterioration in the
guality of the services rendered by the facility. In effect., incremental
use of the facility reduces the marginal utility function of the individuals
who consume the services of the facility. An allocative efficiency problem
results because unrestricted use of the facility generates costs in the
form of utility reductions that are not borne by ma r ginal users.
In Figure I, the curve TWP ' represents the total willingness of
users to pay for the services of a reservoir recreation facility with
specified quality. This function reflects normal demand conditions for
the service. The curve TC represents the constant long-run time and
travel costs required to gain access to and make use of the facility.
If incremental use of the fac i lity generates no congestion costs, the optimal level of use would occur where economic surplus (T~~P - TC) is maximized.
This is shown as X*.
If the facility is of limited capacity, however, crowding effects
begin to occur after some level of use, say Xc. The resulting decrease
ln the perceived quality of the facility and reduction in the value of its
services to users entails congestion costs. The sum of "production" and
congestion costs is shown as TC'. The socially optimum level of facility
use occurs at X**, where net economic surplus (TWP - TC ' ) is maximized.

~ill

WP
$

I

TC'

I
I
~~ TWP*
/,j.7 ~
Cit'
~
I

TC

I
I

o

x**

x*** x*

x

Figure I

i/ This example follows Haveman, R. H. "Common Proper'ty, Congestion,
and Environmental Pollution" Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1973,
No.2. pp. 278-287
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However, under conditions of open access the level of facility
use will not be restricted to X**. The situation can be conceptualized
by constructing a separate schedule of users' willingness to pay at each
stipulated level of facility use beyond X (implying some level of total
congestion costs). Because congestion co~ts are borne by facility users,
the functions depicting these schedules lie below the ori ginal TWP. The
level of each function at the stipulated quantity of facility use (X)
shows users l total willingness to pay, given that quantity of use. The
slope of each function at the stipulated X indicates the value to marginal
users of an increment in facility use. For example, if the level of facility
use is set at X*, aggregate congestion costs equal ab and, with all of
these costs borne by facility users, net total willingness to pay is X*c·
A segment of this function is shown as TWP*, TWP**, and TWP***, which
. depicts function segments for use levels X*, X**, and X***, respectivel y.
By focusing on the socially optimal use level X**, it is clear why
facility use will not be voluntarily restricted to that level. As use of
the facility extends beyond X**, total congestion costs increase beyond
their optimal level of alb', and the constructed total willingness-to-pay
function shifts down from its optimal level of TWP**. The level of use of
the facility will increase until the marginal willingness to pay associated
with a particular level of use is equal to the slope of TC. In Fi gure I,
this equilibrium level of use is X*~*. AtX***, ,the net economic welfare
attributable to the services of the facility is b"c", which is less than
the maximum achieveable welfare increment of b'c ' obtained by restricting
facility use to X**. In this congestion case, overuse is encouraged because
real crowding costs imposed by users on each other are not reflected in
marginal use decisions.
In this congestion case, resource misallocation and welfare loss is
self-limiting, but not to an optimum level. Both the extent of over-use
and the welfare loss reach an upper bound ca used by deterioration in the
quality of the services rendered by the facility. In effect, the 1f?vel of
facility use is limited by the feedback of congestion on willingness to pay
in much the same way that the imposition of a price or charge rations the
facility. Use of the facility is halted before the economic \<Jelfare generated
by the generated by the activity is driven to zero. But use goes beyond
the social optimum rate. A mechanism to ration use (price, permits, etc.)
could be useful. In summary, a planner is ob1"igated to analyze the ' use
and congestion of the recreation facility, not just the total use and interests and willingness of individual users.
Example:

The community of North Logan, Utah, has a surface municipal water
itself during 8 to 10 months of the year. The
its own well or buying water from neighboring
Logan Clty. One would assume that the community should choose the source
for augmentation of supply and stick with it ..
s~pply that is inadequate by
Clty ha~ the choice of using

Watch out for a different kind of situation that req uires more than
a superficial examination. The pump is on a large well, and the lift is
up to the reservoir, which is a lift of 600 feet or so. The pump has a
100 horsepower electric motor. Utah Power and Light Company has a two-part
power tariff. The first part is a "demand" charge. This charge is related
to the motor horsepower and is a substantial minimum flat rate that must be
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paid in any month when the pump is turned on. The second part is based on
power used above the minimum. Therefore, in some months when only minimal
augmentation of the surface water is needed, the cost of pumping a few
gallons of water is exhorbitant. In some months in the summer, a substantial amount of water is needed so the cost of pumping each gallon is quite
reasonable. Our town buys water from Loqan City when a small amount is
needed and pumped when Logan City's price is higher. Again ~ it is necessary
to look at the details.
Example: A closed groundwater basin that is recelvlng no recharge should be
most sparingly and carefully used to extend its life.
But, what about present value concepts in which any positive rate
of discount of the future makes income in the near term more valuable
the same amount in the distant future. A closed groundwater basin is
essentially a mine. Following Anthony Scott, ~ the theory of the mine
can be represented as in Figure 2.
In this case, the value of the resource is not the same for every
unit extracted as it is for most minerals. There is declining marginal
productivity. Notice that either too rapid or too slow rate of resource
withdrawal is inefficient as defined by the difference between total
revenue and total cost or the profit curve.
In Figure 2, A is the rate of maximum current profit per acre foot
of water and B indicates the maximum profit per irrigation season. These
two rates define the range of relevant values. Now, whctt is the optimum?
Clearly, if those who control the water have only one more year or season
after which they can withdraw no more water, then the appropriate rate is
B, the maximum profit for the year. If there is no discount on future
income and if the amount of the reserves and present and future costs and
prices are all known, then profit per acre foot should be maximized at A.
But, to maximize the present value of the resource, future profits must
be discounted. Any rate of interest above zero induces owners of the
water to shorten the life of the groundwater mine. Thus, operators
increase the rate of extraction toward B, the maximum rate of profit per
season.
Let us now introduce the concept of user cost. In Figure 3, we
have UC and UC' . .UC' is at a higher rate of discount than U . User cost
is defined as the present value of profits foregone by a decision to use
a unit of water today. Note that with a higher discount rate less future
profit is foregone by using the resource today. Thus, as rate of discount
is increased, the optimal rate of extraction increases from C to D. In
each case this represents the maximum difference between the profit curve
and user cost. Thus, the water users are not motivated toward maximum
conservation. In this case, like others, high interest rates (discounts
on the future) discourage conservation and preservation.

'i/ Anthony T. Scott. liThe Theory of the Mi ne Under Condi tions of
Certainty.
in Mason Gaffney (ed) Extractive Resources and Taxatio n.
Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.
II
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The Theory of the Mine Relating Various Economic Variables
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Example: A drought comes where a city has first rights to the surface
water. Downstream irrigators can have what1s left over. Put a brick in
the toilet, shower with a friend, and save water. We must conserve.
That1s the usual campaign. But let1s look at it. In the city of
Logan, Utah, and several others in the ~lountain West and .elsewhere, the
city water comes from surface flows and flows downhill to the city. The
water that goes to the city is used both inside and outside the house ..
Water that stays in the pipes (inside use) goes back through the sewer
and treatment facilities and is returned to the river. There is no evidence that water is lost by going through toilets, showers, tubs, and sinks.
Of course, water consumptively used in lawns and gardens does not return
to be used for irrigators. Credibility has been lost by well·-meaning
people campaigning for conservation inside. Most thinking people see through
the sha-Ilowness of such arguments. Better not cry wolf when there is no
danger. We see again that conservation by saving is relevant only for
stock type resources. Purely flow resources cannot be saved.
Example: In avoiding contamination of water supply with elements such as
phosphorus, the most appropriate approach is to keep the material out
of the waterway in the first place.
Not always so. Sources may be diffuse and difficult to corral.
That term may be most appropriate since feedlots and irrigation return
flows are common examples. There are probably several options for management including the possibility of limited or no action to let downstream
users take the effluent if that is most efficient. Figure 4 is a systems
model for phosp~orusmanagement. Note that there are valves or control
points at various places in the system. Each option should be analyzed
to achieve the most efficient management scheme.
A systems approach is essential to look at the ramifications, causes,
and effects of any change as it occurs over space, among users, through
time, and as between management options available. It is seldom true
that there is only one answer or only one way to look at a water supply
problem. To avoid the fallacy of composition and to achieve efficiency and
equity in resource mangement, an open mind and sweeping view i s essential.
Remember Mark Twain. Don1t go beyond the range of your data and analytical
model. Worse yet is if you don1t have an analytical model.
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